Tag: Maduros

  • What Maduro’s threat to ‘liberate’ Puerto Rico says about US-Venezuelan ties under Trump 2.0




    CNN
     — 

    The message seemed designed to reach Washington as one administration prepares to hand the baton to the next: If the United States keeps messing with Venezuela, then Caracas will retaliate by “liberating” the US territory of Puerto Rico, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro claimed last week.

    Notwithstanding the fact that a majority of Puerto Ricans voted in favor of becoming a US state in a nonbinding referendum, or that the last time a Venezuelan army ventured abroad was in the Independence Wars over two hundred years ago, Maduro swaggered as if he were ready to send troops across the sea to the cradle of raggaetón, an imagined not-so-welcome message to President-elect Donald Trump, just 10 days before his inauguration.

    Pundits in Venezuela and Latin America watchers abroad are used to this type of rhetoric and see it as a taste of a spicy relationship to come between Washington and Caracas in the years of Trump 2.0.

    The relationship will probably revolve around three crucial issues: oil, migration, and ideology. Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world and supplies crude oil to the US, particularly to refineries on the Gulf Coast. It is the origin point of more than eight million Venezuelans who have fled the country under Maduro’s regime. Then there’s the matter of his authoritarian socialist state – on the far side of the ideological spectrum from Trump’s rightwing MAGA movement.

    The governor of Puerto Rico Jenniffer Gonzalez swiftly denounced Maduro’s words as “not only a blatant threat of military aggression against the US, but also an incitement against peace and stability in our region.”

    But Indira Urbaneja, a political consultant aligned with the Maduro government, said it was “more a provocation than anything else.”

    “We still have a very delicate political situation requiring (Maduro’s) whole attention. I think Maduro’s priority will be to overcome internal challenges; it’s not like anyone is seriously planning to invade Puerto Rico,” Urbaneja told CNN, in a reference to Venezuela’s restive political opposition movement that maintains that Maduro stole last summer’s election – a claim Maduro has dismissed.

    Maduro’s real aim might have just been to attract Trump’s attention and possibly spark a direct dialogue with the incoming administration, she says.

    The two leaders had a conflictual relationship the first time Trump was in the White House, but Maduro knows that the United States plays the most significant role in influencing Venezuela’s economy, historically by importing the lion’s share of Venezuela’s crude and more recently imposing sectorial sanctions on the oil industry.

    Government supporters gather for a rally to protest against economic sanctions imposed by the US during the first term of President Donald Trump, in Caracas, Venezuela, in 2019.

    Moreover, Maduro himself is accused by the Justice Department of alleged crimes related to narcotrafficking and money laundering, and any new US-Venezuela negotiation is likely to take this into account. Maduro insists the allegations are fabricated.

    Benigno Alarcón, a professor of Politics at Caracas’s Andrés Bello Catholic University, says Maduro’s message might have been miscalculated. “It doesn’t do Maduro any favor… on the contrary, it exacerbates the animosity that exists against Maduro in the US government and among most Americans,” he told CNN.

    How the second Trump administration might deal with the Venezuelan leader’s calls for attention remains an open question.

    Trump referred to Venezuelan’s opposition leaders as “freedom fighters” in a brief post on his social media last week, signaling support for the democratic cause, but some US lobbyists are campaigning for the new administration to engage with Caracas on oil and migration policies.

    The argument for engagement is pragmatic: Trump supports low oil prices and deportations of undocumented migrants, and to reach those goals, he needs the help of Venezuela, the third largest oil exporter to the US in 2024.

    Currently, US and international companies are barred from doing business in Venezuela, except for a few notable exceptions.

    Over the years, the Biden administration has granted special licenses for companies to operate despite the sanctions, to the extent that US major Chevron has returned to play a key role in the Venezuelan oil industry. Over the last 12 months, Venezuela has exported an average of two hundred thousand barrels daily to the United States.

    Marco Rubio, soon-to-be the first Latino Secretary of State, thinks those licenses were a mistake. The Florida politician helped design that sanctions approach to Caracas – his Senate hearing on Wednesday was disrupted by protesters accusing, in Spanish, of “sanctions killing children in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.” At the hearing, Rubio also criticized the Biden administration for being “played” by Maduro and suggested a revision of the current licenses in the months to come.

    At the same time, it’s unlikely the new administration would impose a full embargo that would damage American oil companies and push the Venezuelans to sell even more of their oil to China.

    The S&P Global Commodity team expects the new administration to cancel all licenses except for Chevron’s, hence reducing Venezuela’s oil output with minor damage to oil imports and limited impacts to gas prices.

    Venezuela is also the country of origin of more than eight million migrants, tens of thousands of whom crossed the Southern Border illegally in recent years. The incoming US President has signaled an aggressive immigration push in the very first hours of the new administration, including legislation to do away with a humanitarian parole program designed to provide a legal pathway to the US for Venezuelans and other nationalities.

    But to deport undocumented Venezuelan migrants back to their home country, Trump needs to find an understanding with Maduro, who remains in power despite overseeing his country’s catastrophic economic collapse.

    Last year, Venezuela’s economy stopped crashing, but inflation remains a whopping 48% year on year, meaning that it’s nowhere near turning its corner despite increased oil exports in recent years, according to Maduro.

    Migrants who had crossed the Rio Grande from Mexico walk towards a processing center in Eagle Pass, Texas, on December 18, 2023.

    Over 20 million people in Venezuela, out of a population of over 28 million, live in multidimensional poverty, according to a new report by Human Rights Watch this week. According to data verified by the Washington Office for Latin America, a think-tank, the intention to migrate among Venezuelans increased by over 70% following Maduro’s controversial election in July, suggesting a new emigration wave might be just around the corner.

    Maduro knows that migration is a priority for Trump and is likely hoping that the new administration can be convinced to strike a deal to reduce diplomatic and economic pressure on Caracas in exchange for its acceptance of increased deportation flights.

    “The deal will take place; maybe not at the beginning, but sooner or later, Trump will have to engage with Venezuela on migration. And who do you engage with in Venezuela? With Maduro,” Urbaneja predicted.

    Still, for Trump’s incoming administration, Maduro’s ideology of leftwing populism may be anathema – and that alone could preclude any negotiated working relationship.

    In 2019, the first Trump administration not only envisioned a “maximum pressure” strategy to oust Maduro but managed to form a coalition of over fifty countries to recognize Juan Guaidó, then the president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as the country’s legitimate head of state, an affront Maduro never fails to mention any time he delivers a speech directed abroad.

    This time, according to Laura Dib, director of the Venezuela Program at WOLA, Trump’s cabinet picks suggest various possible approaches.

    Hawkish figures such as Marco Rubio, who is on personal terms with many people in Venezuela’s opposition, and Mike Waltz, Trump’s handpicked national security adviser, have ranted against Maduro for years, but other names, such as upcoming border czar Tom Homan, might push for negotiating deals with Caracas, Dib said.

    A third option could simply be for Trump not to touch the Venezuela dossier for some time, at least until more pressing issues – like the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, competition with China, and the situation on the US-Mexico border – are taken care of, Dib told CNN.

    “Most crucially, we’re yet to hear anything from Richard Grenell, Trump’s appointee to deal with Venezuela… it might be frustrating, but we are yet to see what the new approach will be,” she said.



    The recent threat made by Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to “liberate” Puerto Rico has raised concerns about the state of US-Venezuelan relations under President Trump 2.0. This aggressive rhetoric comes at a time when tensions between the two countries are already heightened, with the US imposing sanctions on Venezuela and backing opposition leader Juan Guaido as the legitimate leader.

    Maduro’s comments about “liberating” Puerto Rico are particularly alarming given the history of US intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean. The island of Puerto Rico is a US territory, and any attempt by Venezuela to assert control over it would undoubtedly provoke a strong response from the United States.

    This latest episode underscores the volatile nature of the relationship between the US and Venezuela, with both countries engaging in a war of words and actions. It also highlights the challenges facing the Trump administration as it navigates a complex and rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape in the Western Hemisphere.

    As tensions continue to simmer, it remains to be seen how the US will respond to Maduro’s threats and what impact this will have on the broader relationship between the two countries. One thing is certain: the situation in Venezuela remains a significant flashpoint in US foreign policy, and the Trump administration will need to tread carefully to avoid further escalation.

    Tags:

    1. Maduro threat
    2. Puerto Rico liberation
    3. US-Venezuelan ties
    4. Trump 2.0
    5. Political relations
    6. International diplomacy
    7. Latin American politics
    8. Maduro regime
    9. Foreign policy
    10. Geopolitical tensions

    #Maduros #threat #liberate #Puerto #Rico #USVenezuelan #ties #Trump

  • US rejects Venezuelan President Maduro’s reelection, but keeps financial lifeline for his government | Nation World


    CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) — Things seemed to be looking up for Venezuela in 2022. Following years of authoritarian rule and withering economic sanctions, President Nicolás Maduro had agreed to work toward a democratic presidential election. The White House, in return, granted him a financial lifeline: a permit for U.S. energy giant Chevron to pump and export Venezuelan oil.

    Oil wells roared back to life and massive tanker ships returned to Venezuela’s coast to be filled with heavy, hard-to-refine crude destined for the U.S.


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    Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.



    The United States has officially rejected the reelection of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, declaring his recent victory in the presidential election as illegitimate. Despite this, the US has decided to keep the financial lifeline open for his government, a move that has sparked controversy and debate.

    Many critics argue that by maintaining financial support for Maduro’s government, the US is indirectly legitimizing his presidency and perpetuating the oppressive regime in Venezuela. However, supporters of the decision argue that cutting off financial aid could worsen the humanitarian crisis in the country and harm the Venezuelan people.

    The US government has stated that it will continue to closely monitor the situation in Venezuela and will take further action if necessary. In the meantime, the debate over the US stance on Maduro’s reelection and its financial support for his government continues to rage on.

    Tags:

    1. US rejects Venezuelan President Maduro’s reelection
    2. Venezuelan President Maduro’s reelection
    3. US-Venezuela relations
    4. Maduro government financial lifeline
    5. US foreign policy towards Venezuela
    6. Venezuelan election controversy
    7. Maduro administration sanctions
    8. US aid to Venezuela
    9. Political unrest in Venezuela
    10. US government stance on Maduro

    #rejects #Venezuelan #President #Maduros #reelection #financial #lifeline #government #Nation #World

  • US rejects Venezuelan President Maduro’s reelection, but keeps financial lifeline for his government


    CARACAS, Venezuela — Things seemed to be looking up for Venezuela in 2022. Following years of authoritarian rule and withering economic sanctions, President Nicolás Maduro had agreed to work toward a democratic presidential election. The White House, in return, granted him a financial lifeline: a permit for U.S. energy giant Chevron to pump and export Venezuelan oil.

    Oil wells roared back to life and massive tanker ships returned to Venezuela’s coast to be filled with heavy, hard-to-refine crude destined for the U.S.

    Maduro’s promised election was neither fair nor free, and the longtime president was sworn in this month for a third six-year term despite credible evidence that his opponent got more votes. Yet, the sanctions reprieve the U.S. offered “to support the restoration of democracy” is still helping fill state coffers.

    Venezuela’s opposition says Maduro’s government has earned billions of dollars from exports allowed by the permit.

    The White House has ignored calls from the main opposition coalition, as well as Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress, to cancel a permit that now accounts for around a quarter of the South American country’s oil production.

    Senior administration officials have struggled to explain why the permit has been left in place under questioning by reporters, saying only that sanctions policy toward Venezuela is frequently reviewed. President Joe Biden told reporters last week he “didn’t have enough data” to adjust oil-related sanctions before he leaves office Monday.

    Venezuela sits atop the world’s largest proven oil reserves and once used them to power Latin America’s strongest economy. But corruption, mismanagement and eventual U.S. economic sanctions saw production steadily decline from the 3.5 million barrels per day pumped in 1999, when the fiery Hugo Chávez took power and began his self-described socialist revolution, to less than 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.

    California-based Chevron Corp., which first invested in Venezuela in the 1920s, does business in the country through joint ventures with the state-owned company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., commonly known as PDVSA.

    The joint ventures produced about 200,000 barrels a day in 2019, but the following year, U.S. sanctions imposed by then-President Donald Trump forced Chevron to wind down production.

    In 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a 30% decline in the country’s economic activity, Venezuela’s Central Bank reported year-over-year inflation of over 1,800%. For many, rummaging through garbage in search of food scraps or valuable items became a common activity.

    Locked out of world oil markets by U.S. sanctions, Venezuela sold its remaining oil output at a discount — about 40% below market prices — to buyers like China and other Asian markets. It even started accepting payments in Russian rubles, bartered goods or cryptocurrency.

    Once Chevron got a license to export oil to the U.S., its joint ventures quickly began producing 80,000 barrels a day, and by 2024, they topped their daily output from 2019. That oil is sold at world market prices.

    The terms of the license bar Chevron from directly paying taxes or royalties to Venezuela’s government. But the company sends money to the joint ventures, which are majority-owned by PDVSA.

    “What Chevron is doing is buying oil from joint ventures,” Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodriguez said. “This purchase of oil is what generates the revenue of the joint ventures,” and that revenue pays taxes and royalties to Venezuela’s government.

    It is not clear exactly how Venezuela’s government, which stopped publishing almost all financial data several years ago, uses this revenue. Neither the government nor Chevron have made public the terms of the agreement allowing the company’s return to Venezuela.

    Chevron did not answer questions from The Associated Press regarding the joint ventures, including payments made to Venezuela’s treasury.

    “Chevron conducts its business in Venezuela in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations,” Chevron spokesman Bill Turenne said in a statement.

    Economist José Guerra, a former economic research manager at Venezuela’s Central Bank, said the license’s impact is partly reflected in the nation’s foreign cash reserves, which increased by roughly $1 billion between February 2022 and November 2024, according to the institution’s data. The government uses its dollar reserves in part to maintain an artificially low exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Venezuelan bolivar.

    “The only explanation is that Chevron exports without discounts, it exports everything — the 200,000 barrels go abroad — and that is what is feeding the reserves,” Guerra said. “I call it Saint Chevron.”

    The outcome of Venezuela’s presidential election, and a subsequent campaign of repression, have prompted new calls to rescind the licenses.

    “In the end, one wonders, and quite rightly so, why the Biden administration continues to maintain a license whose objective was not achieved,” said Rafael de la Cruz, who is an adviser to the opposition campaign of Edmundo González and María Corina Machado. He said the opposition has estimated that Maduro’s government has received about $4 billion through the operation of the joint ventures.

    Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, stacked with government loyalists, declared Maduro the winner of the July 28 election hours after polls closed. But unlike in previous contests, electoral authorities did not provide detailed vote counts, while the opposition collected tally sheets from 85% of electronic voting machines showing its candidate, González, won by a more than a two-to-one margin. U.N. experts and the U.S.-based Carter Center, both invited by Maduro’s government to observe the election, said the tally sheets published by the opposition are legitimate.

    “The election was stolen. Therefore, the basis for any lifting of sanctions doesn’t exist,” said Elliot Abrams, who was special representative for Venezuela during Trump’s first term. “So, why isn’t the administration then reimposing the full sanctions?”

    Maduro continues to boast of his resistance to U.S. influence. “Venezuela will not be colonized or dominated, neither by carrot diplomacy nor by stick diplomacy,” he said after taking the oath of office on Jan. 10. “Venezuela must be respected.”

    The disputed results have deepened Venezuela’s protracted social, economic and political crisis, which has has pushed millions into poverty, stunted hungry children’s growth and driven entire families to migrate. More than 7.7 million Venezuelans have already left their homeland since Maduro became president in 2013.

    Rodriguez said in a December analysis that a U.S. government decision to revoke Chevron’s license or further tighten sanctions “would have discernible effects on migration.” He estimated that more than 800,000 Venezuelans could emigrate between 2025 and 2029 if Chevron’s license is canceled.

    After Maduro’s inauguration, Biden defended his decision not to toughen sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector, explaining that the idea is “still being investigated in terms of what impact it would have and whether or not it would just be replaced by Iran or any other” country’s oil market.

    “It matters what would happen afterwards,” he told reporters.



    The United States has officially rejected the reelection of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, citing concerns over the legitimacy of the election process. However, despite this rejection, the US has decided to maintain its financial lifeline to his government.

    This decision comes as a surprise to many, as the US has been a vocal critic of Maduro’s administration and has imposed numerous sanctions against Venezuela in an effort to pressure him to step down. The decision to continue providing financial support to his government has raised questions about the US’s commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in the region.

    Critics argue that by maintaining financial ties with Maduro’s government, the US is effectively propping up a regime that has been accused of numerous human rights abuses and has plunged the country into a deep economic crisis. However, supporters of the decision argue that cutting off financial support could further destabilize the country and harm the Venezuelan people.

    The future of US-Venezuela relations remains uncertain, as the US continues to grapple with how to best address the ongoing political and humanitarian crisis in the country. It remains to be seen how Maduro will respond to this rejection and whether it will lead to further tensions between the two countries.

    Tags:

    1. US rejects Venezuelan President Maduro
    2. Venezuelan President Maduro’s reelection
    3. US financial lifeline for Maduro’s government
    4. Venezuela political turmoil
    5. International relations with Venezuela
    6. US foreign policy towards Maduro
    7. Maduro’s disputed reelection
    8. US sanctions on Venezuela
    9. Maduro’s government financial support
    10. US-Venezuela diplomatic relations

    #rejects #Venezuelan #President #Maduros #reelection #financial #lifeline #government

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