Will U.S. Bosnia Policy Tilt Toward Vucic and Dodik?

Most discussions in Washington about the Trump administration’s approach to global affairs relate to Ukraine, China, the Middle East, and most recently Greenland; there is little talk of the Western Balkans. Nonetheless, shifts in U.S. foreign policy in the region could upset the fragile status quo prevailing there. The Western Balkans’ current state of affairs and delicate geopolitical equilibrium have prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from sliding back into civil war while keeping the Serbia-Kosovo conflict frozen for the past 26 years.

Serb nationalists, in particular, are hopeful about U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House. They are optimistic that his administration will align Washington more closely with Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb statelet of Republika Srpska.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik want the United States to counter other western governments and institutions that strongly support Kosovo’s independence and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s centralized structure as established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the U.S.-brokered peace deal that rigidly divided the war-torn country into two main entities—the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which both exist under a central government that has a rotating presidency among the three main communities: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

Under the banner of defending Serb interests and advancing the cause of Serb unification, Dodik has spent years undermining the Dayton Agreement by obstructing Bosnia’s national institutions through various actions deemed dangerous and destabilizing by the United States and other western governments.

In practical terms, this would mean easing U.S. constraints on pro-Russian Serbs who desire Serb unification and oppose sanctions on Moscow. Such constraints and pressures include sanctions on Dodik and ultranationalists, including Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, who previously headed Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency and was known for his ties to Moscow and his harassment of anti-Putin voices in Serbia’s Russian émigré community.

Additionally, the previous U.S. administration recently imposed sanctions on NIS, Serbia’s oil and gas company, which is majority owned by Gazprom. It is not difficult to imagine Trump easing pressure on Serbia over its relationship with Russia while keeping quiet about Serbia’s human rights issues.

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Serbs who believe in “Greater Serbia” stake claims to land in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere outside modern-day Serbia’s borders. During the 1990s, then-Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s pursuit of a Greater Serbia was a major factor in the wars that tore the region apart.

Although Vucic has said his government has no interest in redrawing international borders, many of Serbia’s neighbors suspect that Belgrade patiently sees realization of Greater Serbia as a longer-term objective. A 13-page declaration—adopted by Serbia and Republika Srpska in June 2024—outlines a vision for Serb dominance that would place portions of Kosovo back under Belgrade’s control and violate Bosnian sovereignty.

Shortly after Trump’s electoral victory last November, Vucic had a “very cordial” phone call with him, invited him to Belgrade, and credited him with knowing “many things about Serbia,” and noted that Trump’s approval ratings in Serbia are higher than in any other European country.

Richard Grenell, the special presidential envoy for Serbia and Kosovo peace negotiations between 2019 and 2021, was a central figure in maintaining a friendly Washington-Belgrade relationship during Trump’s first term. Throughout Joe Biden’s presidency, Grenell visited Belgrade multiple times. In 2023, Grenell received order of the Serbian flag, and Vucic praised him for “witnessing the truth about the events in Kosovo and elsewhere in the region.”

Regardless of Grenell’s role in Trump’s second administration, Kosovo is likely nervous about Trump 2.0, and for good reason. The United States has recognized Kosovo’s independence since 2008, and today the majority of United Nations member states—including the vast majority of European countries—do, too. But Serbia, Russia, China, and a long list of mostly non-Western states recognize Kosovo as part of Serbia.

Because of Russia and China’s positions in the U.N. Security Council, it is essentially a given that the U.N. will not formally recognize Kosovo’s independence. Trump has previously threatened to withdraw U.S. military forces from the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a NATO-led peacekeeping team, alarming officials in Pristina.

However, even if Trump makes good on this threat, that would not necessarily prove an existential crisis for Kosovo. KFOR should be capable of continuing its operations in the event of a U.S. pullout, mostly because Pristina has prepared for this possible scenario by strengthening its relationship with Turkey in recent years.

In the aftermath of violence that broke out between KFOR and Serbia in May 2023, Ankara deployed a commando battalion to Kosovo. The Turks have also sold Bayraktar drones to Pristina. In late 2024, the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (a Turkish state-owned defense company) and Kosovo inked a deal to build an ammunition manufacturing factory in Kosovo.

In late 2023, Dodik said Trump winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election would make for a “better geopolitical situation for Republika Srpska” and that under such circumstances he would declare the Serb entity’s independence. After Trump won, Dodik declared it was a “victory” for Republika Srpska, too, and wore a MAGA hat outside his presidential palace. Banja Luka maintains good relations with Moscow, which leverages the tense situation in Bosnia to Russia’s advantage, viewing Republika Srpska as a “Balkan Transnistria”—a reference to the Russian-dominated sliver of land in Moldova.

Likewise, a pro-Russian enclave within Bosnia keeps NATO and the European Union nervous about instability in the Western Balkans—a tactic that the Kremlin can always use to distract from Ukraine—and creates an issue that prevents Bosnia from joining NATO.

At the same time, Western sanctions on Dodik have pushed Republika Srpska closer to China. In 2016, Republika Srpska and China entered into a cooperation agreement that formalized ties, and China has invested in construction projects and power plants throughout the Bosnian Serb enclave over the years.

Washington and London have sanctioned Dodik for his corruption and actions that threaten Bosnia’s fragile equilibrium. The United States, under President Barack Obama, first sanctioned the Kremlin-friendly Bosnian Serb leader in January 2017 for defying orders from Bosnia’s Constitutional Court. Dodik hopes that Trump will ease U.S. pressure on him, giving him free rein to obstruct the Dayton Agreement.

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Power brokers in Banja Luka are optimistic that Washington could break with most EU and NATO members—which see preservation of the Dayton Agreement as key to stability and security in southeastern Europe—and instead align with Hungary vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has close relationships with Vucic, Dodik, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, has made Hungary the EU’s most sympathetic nation when it comes to ending Western pressure on Dodik. Orban, Vucic, and Dodik have established a triangular brotherhood, and some bet that Trump will become the fourth figure in it.

If the Bosnian Serb strongman succeeds in getting Washington to lift sanctions, he will “surely be emboldened to go on with his agenda,” said Vladimir Trapara, a senior research fellow at the Belgrade-based Institute of International Politics and Economics. Although Dodik may talk about separatism to rally his constituents in Republika Srpska, he might not ever make such a bold move given various practical considerations, including risks of a new war in the Balkans.

Trapara drew a distinction between Dodik’s populism-driven agenda and his “real political goals.” The Bosnian Serb leader tends to play the separatist card to whip up support from Serb nationalists when doing so makes for good politics, only to focus more on administrative issues when emotions are less charged.

Known for his transactional approach to foreign policy, Trump will likely seek major diplomatic and business deals in the Western Balkans. The Trump family’s business dealings in Serbia include Affinity Partners (his son-in-law Jared Kushner’s investment firm) securing a 99-year permit to develop a luxury hotel in Belgrade at a site that was bombed by NATO in 1999 and investing roughly $1 billion in luxury hotels and villas on Albania’s coast.

Such business interests may well factor into the Trump administration’s approach to this region, possibly complicating the picture with interests in Albania running counter to an increasingly pro-Belgrade policy. After all, Trump is known for making foreign-policy decisions based on the highest bidder and through personal connections, rather than traditional institutions.

In terms of Bosnia’s territorial integrity, authorities in Banja Luka seem to believe that the Trump administration might deprioritize the Dayton Agreement’s enforcement mechanisms. Trump’s general lack of interest in so-called transatlantic values, combined with his good relations with Orban and Vucic, might lead power brokers in Republika Srpska to have high hopes about Trump 2.0.

“While Belgrade may not openly pursue territorial ambitions, Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer opportunities to push nationalist goals subtly,” said Petar Milutinovic, a research associate from the Belgrade-based Institute of European Studies. “Dodik, in particular, might exploit perceived U.S. disengagement to intensify calls for Republika Srpska’s independence.”

But things could turn out differently—and assumptions about Trump’s transactional foreign-policy approach being inherently positive for Serbia are overly simplistic. Albania and Kosovo spend money on U.S. lobbying efforts to advance their own interests, which include persuading Washington to advocate for Kosovo’s independence, bolster the Albania-U.S. alliance, and maintain pressure on Belgrade.

There could also be a role for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, given Ankara’s close relations with Sarajevo, Tirana, and Pristina. “Good relations between Erdogan and Trump, if used wisely, [have] the potential to improve U.S. relations with Bosniaks and Albanians, which are [currently] pretty dysfunctional,” explained Jahja Muhasilovic, a geopolitical analyst and an associate professor at the International University of Sarajevo.

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If Trump succeeds—as promised—in freezing the Russia-Ukraine war, with portions of Ukrainian land remaining under Russian control, the reverberations would be felt across Europe. Such a diplomatic agreement on Ukraine could make the West appear weak, especially if it is accompanied by the lifting of some sanctions against Russia. Pro-Russian Serb nationalists could interpret such a scenario as “a victory for Moscow’s strategy, reinforcing their anti-Western rhetoric and calls for regional reordering, such as aspirations for secession in Republika Srpska or undermining Kosovo’s sovereignty,” Milutinovic said.

Dejan Sajinovic, a Bosnian columnist and editor for Nezavisne Novine, explained how Belgrade is most comfortable when there is an equilibrium of influence in the region, with both NATO members and Russia making concessions to Serbia. “When either side gains more strength, the balance is disturbed, and it usually means some sort of instability in the Balkans,” he said.

Trump’s unpredictability suggests that the optimism of Dodik and other Serbs could be misplaced. Simultaneously, ongoing Russian influence in southeastern Europe will limit Belgrade and Banja Luka’s ability to move closer to Washington. With Trump’s return to the White House, Serb nationalists should therefore think carefully about what they wish for.